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Abstract 
Actions that affect environmental quality both influence and respond to macro- 
economic variables. Furthermore, many environmental nd macroeconomic conse- 
quences of current actions will have uncompensated ffects that outlive the actors. 
This paper presents an overlapping-generations model of environmental externalities 
and capital accumulation. Policies pursued by short-lived governments that affect 
capital accumulation and environmental quality, although myopically optimal, fail to 
internalize the long-lived external effects of their constituents' actions. Conse- 
quently, tax policies must be set by a long-lived government agency whose planning 
horizon is the environment's, not the individual agent's, lifetime. 
Keywords: Environmental externalities; Overlapping enerations; Capital 
accumulation 
JEL  classification: D62; D90; O41; Q29 
1. Introduction 
The 1992 Un i ted  Nat ions Conference on Env i ronment  and Deve lopment  
(the 'Ear th  Summit ' )  focused attent ion on the world env i ronment  and the 
economic  and env i ronmenta l  effects of current behavior  on future genera-  
tions. S tandard  economic  analysis suggests that if env i ronmenta l  prob lems 
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can be classified as consumption and production externalities, their solutions 
are straightforward: either impose Pigouvian taxes or open markets in the 
externalities. Such analysis, being implicitly static, ignores two important 
aspects of the environmental problems central to the Earth Summit 
discussions. First, consumption and production externalities are inter- as 
well as intragenerational: actions taken today affect the welfare of future 
generations. Such external effects are intrinsically hard to internalize; their 
existence almost surely alters the set of socially desirable policies. Second, 
the macroeconomic perspective is missing. Actions that affect the environ- 
ment both influence and respond to macroeconomic variables, and en- 
vironmental policy decisions have implications for economic growth and 
capital accumulation. This paper considers how governments make decisions 
concerning the provision of a public good--environmental quality--where 
these decisions have long-lasting effects. 
Environmental issues have been analyzed in the environmental and 
natural resource literatures (see Baumol and Oates, 1988; Conrad and 
Clark, 1987; Cropper and Oates, 1992; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; and 
Neher, 1990). Researchers have investigated mechanisms under which a 
decentralized economy might successfully internalize environmental exter- 
nalities. Such mechanisms include Pigouvian taxes (Wittman, 1985), markets 
for effluents (Krupnick et al., 1983), and pollution licenses (Montgomery, 
1972). On the basis of these analyses, policies have been offered and in 
some cases successfully implemented (Hahn, 1989). But by assuming that 
the life span of individuals and the economy are the same, these researchers 
have restricted themselves to the analysis of intragenerational conflict. While 
our analysis also investigates policies that internalize the externalities 
present in the model, their design is complicated by our explicitly intergene- 
rat ional focus. 
Intergenerational issues have been discussed in the exhaustible resource 
literature (see Solow, 1974, 1986), but not, for the most part, in models of 
pollution. To date there is little use of an overlapping-generations frame- 
work in either the exhaustible resource or pollution literatures, despite the 
appeal of this structure for analysis of intergenerational issues. Exceptions 
are Kemp and Long (1980) and Mourmouras (1991) who construct over- 
lapping-generations models of natural resources, and Sandier (1982) who 
analyzes the optimal provision of club goods in a finite-horizon economy. 
The model developed in this paper utilizes the overlapping-generations 
framework of Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958), and Diamond (1965). In the 
model agents live two periods, working while young and consuming while 
~Howarth and Norgaard (1990) use a thri~e-period model with distinct generations to
consider the impact of property rights on intergenerational equity. Intergenerational exter- 
nalities are the focus of John et al.'s (1993) analysis of weapons accumulation a d arms control. 
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old. They divide their wage between saving and a tax used to maintain and 
improve the environment. Agents get utility from consumption and the 
quality of the environment; consumption degrades the environment left to 
future generations. 
We analyze two cases. In the first the tax is determined by a one-period- 
lived government that sets taxes to maximize the utility of those alive during 
its term in office. The government ignores the effects of current consump- 
tion and taxation decisions on future generations' welfare. We find that 
economies better able to maintain their environments, with less polluting 
consumption or with slower population growth rates, enjoy better environ- 
ments and higher capital stocks in steady-state equilibrium. These results 
suggest sources of environmental and economic differences between the 
East and the West, and the North and the South. Economies with more 
productive technologies or higher capital depreciation rates also enjoy better 
environments but their capital stocks may be higher or lower, in contrast o 
standard models. 
We also analyze the decisions of a long-lived planner who maximizes the 
utility of a representative g neration. The planner sets the capital stock to 
its golden rule level. In contrast, the steady-state equilibrium determined by 
a sequence of short-lived planners may be dynamically inefficient in either 
capital and/or  the environment. In the dynamically inefficient economies 
Pareto-improving policies exist and can be achieved through tax-transfer 
schemes designed by the long-lived planner. 
2. The environment 
Consider an infinite-horizon economy comprised of two-period-lived 
agents, perfectly competitive firms, and a government that is either short- or 
long-lived. A new generation of N, agents is born at each date t = 1, 2, .... 
Population grows at the rate n: N,=( I+n)N,_  1. Young agents have 
preferences defined over consumption in old age, ct+l, and an index of the 
quality of the environment when they consume, E,+I. These preferences are 
represented by U(Ct+l) -~- t~(E/+l). Assume that U(.  ) and ~b(. ) are increas- 
ing, twice continuously differentiable, and strictly concave. Further assume 
limc~0U' = oo. 
Since we focus on external effects across generations, we abstract from 
the well-understood free-rider problems within a generation. We assume, 
initially, that at the beginning of each date agents elect a government for a 
one-period term to enact policies for the benefit of agents alive during its 
term. The government levies lump-sum taxes on the young to achieve the 
desired environmental quality, a public good. In Section 5 we consider the 
taxes imposed by a long-lived government, set up to implement policies to 
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improve the welfare of the current and all future generations. Such a 
government can design policies that internalize intergenerational exter- 
nalities. 
Young agents are each endowed with one unit of labor that they supply to 
firms inelastically. They divide their wage, w,, between saving for old age 
consumption, s,, and payment of an environmental maintenance and 
improvement tax, m,. When old, agents supply their saving inelastically to 
firms and earn the gross return (1 + Ft+ 1 - -  ~) .  
The quality of the environment is determined by 
E,+, = (1 - b)E,  - f lN ,_ ,c  t + yN, m, , (1) 
where b E(0,  1] measures the autonomous evolution of environmental 
quality, /3N,_,c, is degradation of the environment by the consumption of 
the old at t, /3 >0,  yN,  m,  measures environmental improvement from 
government programs funded by tax revenues at t, y >0,  and E, i>0 is 
given. E t E [~ is the index of environmental quality. One interpretation of E, 
is the quality of soil or groundwater, where contamination reduces E, and 
environmental c ean-up increases E,. Another interpretation of E t might be 
the inverse of the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; maintenance 
in this case could correspond to the planting of trees. If we interpret 
environmental quality more broadly, we could also think of E, as corre- 
sponding to national parks, which have amenity value and which also 
require maintenance. 2 In an economy undisturbed by human activity, E = 0; 
human actions either improve or worsen the environment. 
Firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers who produce using the 
constant returns production function Y, = o~F(K,, N,), a > O. Thus, output 
per worker can be written as y, = af (k t ) ,  where k, is the capital- labor ratio, 
and where f ' ( .  ) > O, f" ( .  ) ~< O, f(O) -- 0 and l imk~=f'  ( • ) -- O. Assume that 
the capital stock depreciates at rate 6 E [0, 1] during the production process. 
The representative agent at time t takes as given the wage, the return on 
saving, the tax, and the environmental quality, and chooses , and c,+~ to 
max U(c,+,) + ~b(Et+l) (2) 
subject to 
W t = S t -~- m, ,  (3) 
Ct+ 1 : (1 + r,+ 1 - 6)s, ,  (4) 
z For many environmental problems, such as biodiversity loss, ozone layer depletion, or air 
pollution, direct improvement of the environment is difficult or impossible. We could, however, 
interpret m, as abatement measures toprevent environmental degradation, and view Eq. (1) as 
a linear approximation f a more complicated relationship between consumption, abatement, 
and environmental quality. 
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Ct+ 1 ~0, st~O. 
The solution to this prob lem involves the agent setting saving equal to the 
after-tax wage and, when old, consuming the gross return on saving. 
The individual firm takes wages and rental rates as given. It hires labor 
and capital until their marginal products equal their factor prices 
a [ f (k , )  - kt f ' (k , )  ] = w, ,  (5) 
af ' (k , )  = r , .  (6) 
The goods market  clears when demand for goods equals supply of goods: 
s, + m,  + c, / (1 + n) = w, + (1 + r, - ~)k , .  (7) 
Combin ing Eqs. (3), (4), and (7) yields 
s,_ 1 = (1 + n)k , .  (8) 
While individual agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on 
the quality of the environment,  their elected officials do. The short- l ived 
government  imposes taxes on the young to maximize their l ifetime utility 
subject to the conditions that the old cannot be made worse off by these 
actions, the firm sector is perfectly competit ive,  and the goods market  
clears. The government 's  prob lem is choose kt+ 1 to maximize (2) subject to 
(3)-(8),  and (1), which reduces to 
max U[(1 + a f ' (k ,+ l )  - t~)k,+a(1 + n)] 
+ 6[(1 - b)E  t - [~gt_l c` q- ygt (o t f (k , )  - o tkt f ' (k t )  - kt+l(1 + n))] .  
The  f irst-order condit ion is 
U ' ( .  )(1 + af ' ( .  ) - ~ + a f " ( .  )k,+,) - vN ,6 ' ( "  ) = 0.  (9) 
The government  chooses k,+~ to equate the sum across agents of their 
marginal  rates of substitution between consumption and environmental  
quality to the marginal  rate of transformation.  3 Furthermore,  (9) reflects the 
fact that the government  recognizes that the return to capital is decreasing at 
the margin,  and internalizes this effect when setting the maintenance tax. 
The short- l ived government 's  choices internalize the current period 
external ity the young impose upon themselves when they are old by not 
Our analysis assumes an interior solution with m > 0, but nothing in the model precludes 
the possibility that the government chooses not to engage in any maintenance and sets m = 0. 
The zero-maintenance taxcase is analyzed in a similar model in John and Pecchenino (1994). 
Note that the boundary conditions on the utility functions ensure that the government always 
chooses a strictly positive consumption level. In the absence of transfers to the old this is 
sufficient o guarantee that saving will be strictly positive. 
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taking account of the effects of their actions on environmental quality, a 
public good. Thus, the government's role reduces to the optimal provision 
of a public good for a single generation. The government does not, 
however, act in any way to affect the intergenerational externality imposed 
by the current generation on future generations via the bequeathed en- 
vironmental quality. 
3. The steady state 
A competitive steady-state quilibrium for this economy is given by 
{c, m, e, k}, where e ~ Et/N,, Vt, such that 
(i) the government maximizes (2) subject to (1) and (3)-(8) given 6 and 
e,; 
(ii) per capita environmental quality is constant for all t: 
e = n + b m (n + b)(1 + n) c.  (10) 
This definition of a steady state differs from the more standard case in 
which all generations enjoy equal utility. Here, environmental quality grows 
at rate n, so utility increases over time. The difference arises because 
environmental quality is a public rather than a private good. The standard 
concept of a steady state would hold E, constant for all t, generating a
decline in per capita environmental quality at rate n. A steady state in which 
all per capita values are constant exists only if the first-order condition is 
independent of N,, that is if ~b'(Et+1) is inversely proportional to Nt+l. Thus, 
in general, this model may not have a steady state. To permit a steady-state 
analysis, we assume that ~b(Et) = In E,, so that ~b'(.) = 1/(Nte); this implies 
E~ > 0. For convenience we also assume U(c~) = In ct. 4 
With these functional forms, a steady-state equilibrium is represented by 
steady-state environmental quality 
1 
e=n+b [y (a f ( . ) -ak f ' ( . ) -k ( l  +n)) -~( l  +af ' ( . ) -6)k] ,  (11) 
and the first-order condition, (9), 
4 While the steady-state path is a special case, it allows for a direct comparison between this 
work and other Diamond-style overlapping-generations models without external effects 
(Diamond, 1965), and to standard static models with public goods. In a similar model without 
population growth (John and Pecchenino, 1994), out-of-steady-state behavior is analyzed. That 
model considers both positive and negative E. 
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[1 + ~f '  - a + ~f"(- )k] 
- O. (12) 
[1 + af t ( ' ) -6 ]k  e 
The short-lived government internalizes all intragenerational externalities, 
but intergenerational externalities remain. Deterioration of the environment 
due to consumption is a pure public bad. Improvement due to maintenance 
is not a pure public good because today's planner accounts for the effect of 
current maintenance on next period's environmental quality. The net 
external effect may be positive or negative. Because the externalities 
operate through changes in environmental quality, the autonomous evolu- 
tion of the environment implies that the external effects of a given 
generation's actions die out over time. In the steady state, the marginal 
utility from environmental improvement also diminishes over time, because 
E, is increasing. 
4. Comparat ive statics 
The comparative static results that follow are for an interior equilibrium. 
Total differentiation of Eqs. (11) and (12) yields: 
1 b2 :]I=l 
7 -c / ( l+n)  = n--+b n + b 
d/3 
× dn , 
d6 
da 
-e  -yk  
n+b 
0 0 
/3k 
n+b 
- -  oL f  tt 
(1 + a f '  - 8) 2 
- (/3_+ ~,)f'~, +_~,f-[ 
n+b | 
I 
( l+af -a )  2 ] 
(13) 
where 
1 (1 +,~f '  - ~)~f  . . . .  (,~f,,)2 
~-  k 2 ~- ( l+af '  -t;) 2 
and 
¢:_ 1 n + b [(y +/3)ctf"k + y(1 + n) +/3(1 + a f '  - 6)]. 
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The determinant of the left-hand-side matrix is A=-~-y~/e  2. The 
following conditions together are sufficient for A < O: 
(i) ~" ~< O; 
(ii) ~/> O. 
Sufficient for (i) is that consumption be a concave function of k, and 
sufficient for (ii) is that the maintenance tax [oil(k) - a f ' ( .  )k - (1 + n)k] be 
decreasing in k. Conditions (i) and (ii) are not very restrictive. 
The following propositions et out the comparative static behavior of the 
model when preferences are logarithmic and conditions (i) and (ii) hold. 
Since the proofs are straightforward, they are left to the reader. 
Proposition 1. Economies with better environmental maintenance tech- 
nologies (higher 3') accumulate more capital and have higher environmental 
quality. 
The representative government imposes taxes so that individual agents are 
indifferent between maintaining environmental quality and consuming. An 
economy with a more productive maintenance t chnology can devote less to 
maintenance to achieve a given environmental quality. Thus, both the 
environment and capital can be sustained at higher levels. 
Proposition 2. Economies in which consumption causes greater environmen- 
tal degradation (higher [3) accumulate l ss capital and have poorer environ- 
ments. 
If each unit of consumption causes significant environmental degradation, 
then more resources must be dedicated to maintenance for the government 
to achieve the optimal allocation, leaving fewer resources for saving and 
consumption. 
Propositions 1 and 2 identify two potential explanations for the divergent 
experiences of Eastern Europe and the OECD countries. Eastern Europe 
has experienced poor environmental quality and low levels of consumption. 
In our model, even if capital is equally productive in both East and West, 
the East could have suffered because it had access only to inferior 
environmental maintenance and/or disposal (consumption) technologies. 
Proposition 3. Economies with higher population growth rates (higher n) 
have lower rates of capital accumulation and worse environmental quality. 
An increase in the population growth rate increases the amount of stress 
placed on the environment, forcing a reallocation away from capital and 
consumption toward maintenance. The net effect of this is a reduction of 
both steady-state capital and environmental quality. This result is consistent 
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with the divergence between the developed and the developing nations in 
both capital accumulation and environmental quality. 
Proposition 4. Economies with higher rates of capital depreciation (higher 6) 
have higher equilibrium environmental quality and accumulate more or less 
capital than economies with lower rates of capital depreciation. 
All else equal, the higher an economy's rate of capital depreciation, the 
lower its consumption and the better its environment. Whether the govern- 
ment reallocates resources from maintenance to capital accumulation 
depends on the marginal utility from a better environment relative to the 
marginal disutility from reduced consumption. 
Proposition 5. More productive conomies (higher a) have lower or higher 
equilibrium capital stocks and better environments. 
Increases in productivity raise total output, allowing increased maintenance 
and consumption. These lead to a better environment and a higher or lower 
capital stock. 
Propositions 4 and 5 differ from Solow (1956) in which higher rates of 
capital depreciation lead to lower rates of capital accumulation and better 
technologies lead to higher rates of capital accumulation. The differences 
arise because capital accumulation has two contradictory effects in this 
model: increased consumption, a good, and increased pollution, a bad. 5 
5. The policies of a long-lived government 
Examination of the short-lived government's problem reveals that while 
intragenerational externalities are internalized, intergenerational ones are 
not. This is because the short-lived government's Planning horizon is the 
same as the life span of an individual. A long-lived government making 
plans over the infinite lifetime of the environment can take both intra- and 
intergenerational effects into account. The feasibility of implementing these 
plans is open to question, because intergenerational externalities are 
5The result in Proposition 4 that dk/d6 may exceed zero stems from the consumption 
externality. If it were replaced by a production externality, then dk/d8 < 0, as in Solow, but 
results qualitatively equivalent to those stated in Propositions 1,3, and 5 would continue to 
obtain. Not surprisingly, in a model with a production externality, an increase in the 
environmental degradation resulting from each unit of production leads to a lower steady-state 
capital stock and a higher or lower environmental quality. Here lower capital reduces output 
which reduces pollution, but may also lead to lower maintenance, h nce the ambiguous effect 
on environmental quality. 
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intrinsically hard to internalize: those imposing the externalities are not alive 
at the same time as those who enjoy or suffer the consequences. 
To compare the short- and long-lived governments' problems we restrict 
our attention to the infinitely-lived government's choice of a steady state, 
under the assumption of logarithmic utility. The long-lived government 
chooses the steady-state capital stock and maintenance tax to maximize the 
utility of a representative g neration. That is, the planner solves 
max In c + In e (14) 
subject o (10) and 
af(k)  + (1 -  6)k = c/(1 + n) + m + k(1 + n),  (15) 
where (15) represents economic feasibility and (10) is steady-state n- 
vironmental quality. The first-order conditions are 
af ' ( . ) -  (n + 8) =0,  (16) 
- ( l+n)  7+/3 
Jr - -  = O.  (17)  
c (n + b)e 
From (16), the government sets capital at the golden-rule level where net 
per capita output is maximized. From (17), the optimal maintenance tax 
internalizes consumption and maintenance xternalities by recognizing the 
intergenerational effects, (T +/3)/(n + b), which the short-lived planners 
ignore. That is, the long-lived government recognizes that consumption 
(maintenance) today degrades (improves) the environment bequeathed to 
the next generation, and so equates the social marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and environmental quality to the marginal rate of 
transformation. 
While the short-lived planner is constrained to dividing young agents' 
wages between saving and maintenance, the long-lived planner can divide 
net output between consumption by the old and taxes by the young to 
achieve a constant level of environmental quality. Thus the planner can 
translate an increase in output into increased consumption while keeping 
environmental quality constant, thus unambiguously increasing utility. The 
planner therefore chooses k to maximize output, and then divides it 
optimally. 
The long-lived planner recognizes that the trade-off between capital and 
the environment perceived by the short-lived government is inefficient since 
it ignores the potential for intergenerational trades (the overlapping-genera- 
tions effect) and the intergenerational environmental effects of consumption 
and maintenance. For the long-lived planner to achieve Pareto-improving 
reallocations in the absence of intergenerational ltruism, the initial old 
must not be discomfited. Thus, Pareto-improving reallocations are possible 
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if the decisions of short-lived governments lead to dynamically inefficient 
allocations: overaccumulation of capital and/or  overaccumulation of en- 
vironmental quality in a steady-state equilibrium. 
Proposition 6. Call the steady-state solution to the short-lived planner's 
problem ([c, ~) and the solution to the long-lived planner's problem (k*, e*). 
I f  [~ > k* and~or ~ > e* at a feasible fc, then Pareto-improving policies exist. 
Proof. If k > k* a reduction in the steady-state capital stock at any date t 
increases output. Since this output can be allocated such that per capita 
environmental quality is maintained while consumption is increased, the 
reallocation is Pareto improving. Let ~ > e*. Consider a small reduction/x in 
the tax at all dates, holding k constant. This implies a transfer to the old of 
/x(1 + n), which increases their consumption at all dates. From (10) the 
change in steady state e is - (y  + [3)tz/(n + b). Taking a Taylor series 
expansion around steady-state consumption and environmental quality 
implies a change in utility of/z[(1 + n)/6 - (y + [3)/(n + b)~]. Since (10) and 
(15) are satisfied in any steady state, it follows that ~ < c*, while ~ > e*. 
From (17) the change in utility is positive; the reallocation is Pareto 
improving. [] 
Recall that the short-lived planner internalizes the effect of capital 
accumulation on the return to capital. This is manifested in the a f t ( .  )k term 
in (9). Since f " ( - )<  0, the internalization biases the planner's choice away 
from capital towards maintenance. It can be shown that the combination of 
/~ < k* and ~ > e* is only possible here because of this effect. That is, if the 
planner were a price-taker with respect to the interest rate or the interest 
rate were fixed, dynamically efficient capital accumulation and inefficient 
environmental quality could not coexist. 6 
When Pareto improvements are possible a long-lived planner can design a 
taxation scheme that leaves the tax choice to the short-lived government but 
which allows the economy to obtain the steady-state optimum. 
Proposition 7. The long-lived planner can implement a tax-transfer scheme 
such that the short-lived planner's choice will achieve the social optimum. 
Proof. Suppose the long-lived planner taxes the net return on capital and 
wages at the rates r k and %, respectively. In the presence of such taxes, the 
short-lived government's problem is to 
6 John and Pecchenino (1994) establish this result in a similar model. They also show that 
k < k* and ~ > e* can arise if there are external increasing returns to capital. 
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max In c,+ 1 + In Et+ 1 
subject to (1) and 
m t = [a f (k , )  - ak ,  f ' (k , ) ] (1  - %)  - k,+,(1 + n) ,  
Ct+ 1 -~- [1 -'~ af ' (k ,+ l )  -- 6](1 -- rk)k,+l(1 + n) + o',, 
Ct+l ,k t+ 1 ~0 , 
where ~r, is a per-capita transfer (lump-sum tax) to the old of generation t.
A steady-state equilibrium for this economy is the vector {c, m, k, t, e} 
such that the short-lived planner optimizes, and the government budget 
constraint is satisfied: 
Nt+l rw[a f (k )  - ak f ' (k ) ]  + N, rk[1 + a f t (k )  - 6]k(1 + n) = X t 
and 
cr t = 2~,/Nt, V t .  
In the steady state the short-lived government's indirect social welfare, as a 
function of the wage and capital tax parameters, is
V(r~, rw) --- ln[{[1 + af ' (k)  - a]k + ~rw[f(k) -k f ' (k ) ]} (1  + n)] 
+ In[ (n~b){y[ [a f (k ) -ak f ' (k ) ] (1 - rw) -k (1  + n)] 
- /3[[1 + af'(-k) - 8 l-k + a%[f(-k) -k f ' (k ) ] ]}] ,  
I 
where k = k(rk, %) implicitly defines the capital stock in a steady-state 
equilibrium. 
The long-lived planner chooses rk and r w to maximize the indirect social 
welfare function. The first-order conditions implify to 
= a + n ,  
l+n  7+/3  
c e(n + b) O, 
where c and e are consumption and environmental quality, respectively, as 
functions of the tax rates. These conditions define r k and %. The first-order 
conditions for the direct and indirect long-lived planner's problems are 
identical: the long-lived planner can choose tax parameters to induce the 
short-lived planner to the steady-state social optimum. [] 
The long-lived planner designs the in tertemporal  Pigouvian tax-transfer 
scheme so that short-lived agents receive the full benefit of their taxes on 
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environmental quality, while bearing the total cost of their consumption. If
the economy is dynamically efficient in both capital and environmental 
quality, a Pareto-improving tax-transfer scheme cannot exist. This result is 
similar to Weitzman's (1974) regarding the difficulty of implementing 
optimal Pigouvian taxes. In a static model Weitzman shows that those who 
benefit from the imposition of the taxes may not be those upon whom the 
taxes fall. To ensure that a tax-transfer scheme results in a Pareto 
improvement, ransfers from the beneficiaries are required. In our model 
the same is true, except hat those who benefit may not yet be alive, and so 
transfers may not be feasible. 
b. Conclusion 
Actions that affect environmental quality both influence and respond to 
macroeconomic variables, and many environmental and macroeconomic 
consequences of agents' actions have uncompensated ffects that outlive the 
actors. This paper has examined the steady-state equilibrium behavior of an 
overlapping-generations model of environmental externalities and capital 
accumulation i which taxes to maintain and improve environmental quality 
are imposed on young agents, and where the consumption of the old 
degrades the environment. We find that while a short-lived government 
provides the myopically optimal level of capital and the public good, 
environmental quality, its policies fail to address the effects of today's 
choices on future generations. A long-lived planner can design policies to 
provide the dynamically optimal level of capital and the public good, but 
such policies may not be Pareto improving. 
Our model argues for the recognition of intergenerational externalities in
formulating environmental nd macroeconomic policy. Specifically, the costs 
of any policy must be compared with the benefits for not only the current 
generation, but for all future generations as well. This suggests that the 
incorporation of public debt into this model, thus allowing a mechanism for 
borrowing from future generations, is a promising direction for future 
research. Our model also suggests that environmental policies, such as those 
proposed at the Earth Summit, are unlikely to be adopted in the absence of 
intergenerational ltruism, and that intergenerational conflict may be at 
least as significant as international disagreement. 7 
7 John and Pecchenino (1993) analyze both intergenerational and international environmen- 
tal externalities. 
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